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Sentencing Under the Federal Youth Corrections
Act: When May a Youth Be Treated as an Adult?
Cynthia A. Kelly*
INTRODUCTION

All judges confront difficult issues in sentencing, but those
judges who must sentence juveniles face an especially complicated
set of problems. Since the establishment of the first juvenile court,
our society has asked judges to treat juveniles somewhat differently than adults. Judges who sentence juveniles are expected to
impose punishment which satisfies society's demands for deterrence and retribution, but which also recognizes that younger offenders may be more amenable than adults to education and
rehabilitation.
The Federal Youth Corrections Act' was passed in 1950 in an
attempt to give federal judges guidance in the sentencing of juvenile offenders. The Youth Corrections Act, described as the most
comprehensive federal statute concerned with sentencing,2
presents a number of alternatives which judges are to consider
when sentencing youth offenders who are under twenty-two years

of age at the time of conviction."
The Youth Corrections Act certainly has not solved the juvenile
crime problem. In fact, juveniles are committing more violent
crimes than ever before.' In addition, judges have had difficulty
*

Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago. B.S., Northwestern Univer-

sity; J.D., University of Pennsylvania; Ph.D., Northwestern University.
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as YCA].
2. United States v. Coefield, 476 F.2d 1152, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
3. The designation of "youth offender" is one of four categories of offenders under the
United States Code. The other categories are the following: juveniles (convicted persons
under the age of 18) who are sentenced under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042 (1976); young adult offenders (between the ages of 22 and 26 when
convicted) who may be sentenced under the YCA if the court finds that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the defendant will benefit from treatment under the Act, 18 U.S.C. §
4216 (1976); and adult offenders.
4. Misconduct by the young, however, is not a new phenomenon. After compiling reports
by many writers from medieval times to the present, Lamar Empey concluded that flaunting
of adult standards by the young probably has not increased over the centuries. For example,
Empey noted that the 19th century Americans "exhibited fright and pessimism over youth
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implementing the Act's provisions. This article will examine the
latest problem involved in interpreting and implementing the
Youth Corrections Act: the continuation of treatment of youthful
offenders following the commission of subsequent crimes. The
problem will be discussed in the context of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ralston v.Robinson.5
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL YOUTH CORRECTIONS ACT

The Federal Youth Corrections Act (YCA)6 was passed by Congress in an effort to provide a system for treatment and rehabilitation of youth offenders. The original impetus for the YCA was a
report made to the Judicial Conference of the United States7 in
1942 which recommended that new sentencing procedures be
adopted to treat criminally inclined youth. The report was
presented before hearings held a year later in the House of Representatives and the Senate, and was ultimately incorporated in the
youth corrections bill which was passed by both Houses of
Congress.'
The bill's statement of purpose emphasized that the bill was
designed to promote the rehabilitation of those who, in the opinion
of the sentencing judge, show promise of becoming useful citizens.
In addition, it was recommended that a system of analysis and
treatment be developed that would cure, rather than accentuate,
the anti-social tendencies that had led to the commission of crime.
behavior. No decent man could safely walk the streets of San Francisco; the term hoodlum
was coined to describe the members of teenage gangs." L. EMPEY, AMERICAN DELINQUENCY:
ITs MEANING AND CONSTRUCTION 2 (1978).
More recent statistics have demonstrated that juveniles are responsible for a high proportion of crimes committed. For example, the number of persons arrested in the United States
under 18 years of age increased from 31,750 in 1948 to 234,474 in 1956; during the same
period, the percentage of arrests of persons under 18 years of age as compared to total
arrests increased from 4.2% to 11.3%. F.B.I., 19 UNIFORM CRIME RPORT 117 (1948); F.B.I.,
27 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 110 (1956). In 1974, juveniles under 18 years of age accounted
for almost one-third of all those arrested for felony offenses. Between 1960 and 1974, the
percentage of juveniles under 18 who were arrested increased over 200%. F.B.I., 46 UNFOlRM
CRIME REPORTS 182 (1975). In 1980, those under 21 years of age comprised 38.4% of all
those who were arrested. F.B.I., UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 202 (1980).
5. 102 S. Ct. 233 (1981).
6. Act of September 30, 1950, ch. 1115, § 2, 64 Stat. 1085 (1950), amending Part IV of
Title 18 of the United States Cede by adding ch. 402.
7. In 1941, Mr. Chief Justice Stone appointed a committee to study the topic of punishment for crime. A subcommittee of these jurists focused on the problem of treating juvenile
offenders. Their recommendations were presented to the Judicial Conference in 1942.
8. S. REP. No. 1180, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) and H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess., cited in 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NFws 3983.
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The passage of the bill was prompted by congressional notice of
statistics which demonstrated that the period between sixteen and
twenty-three years of age is the focal source of crime, 9 and by testimony of sociologists and psychiatrists that special factors operate
in this period to cause anti-social conduct.
Recognizing that existing methods of dealing with youthful offenders were insufficient, Congress looked to the principles of the
Borstal system as a solution. This system, designed originally to
treat young offenders in England, operated by segregating younger
offenders (between the ages of sixteen and twenty-three) from
adult offenders, and by offering young offenders special programs
of education and vocational training based on their individual
needs. 10 Congress provided for a parallel system in the United
States through the creation of a Youth Corrections Division under
the Board of Parole. The Youth Division, in conjunction with the
Bureau of Prisons, was to establish a method of classifying and
treating youth offenders convicted in federal courts.
SENTENCING PROVISIONS UNDER THE

YCA

The sentencing provisions which were incorporated in the YCA
reflect congressional intent to provide individualized treatment for
youth offenders. The Act defines treatment as "corrective and preventive guidance and training designed to protect the public by
correcting anti-social tendencies of youth offenders."'" In order to

9. The bill included the following statistics taken from the 1949 Semiannual Crime Report of the Federal Bureau of Investigation:
Persons 16 to 23, inclusive, constitute 20 percent of our population above the age
15 (based on 1940 census figures), but they are responsible for 47.3 percent of our
robberies; they constitute 55.4 percent of our apprehended burglars, and 63.1 percent of our automobile thieves. Youths under the age of 24 are arrested for major
crimes (homicide, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny-theft, auto theft, and rape) in
greater numbers than persons of any other 5-year age group 25 years of age or
older. They are arrested for serious crimes twice as often as adults from 30 to 34;
three times as often as those 40 to 44, and four times as often as those 45 to 49.
Id. at 3984.
10. Under the Borstal system, a convicted offender was sent to a hospital for a thorough
examination. If no physical or mental defect were found, the youth then met with a board
who determined to which facility he would be sent to best meet his particular needs. The
basic treatment program consisted of instruction in one of a number of trades, in combination with educational and recreational classes and physical activity. Statistics compiled in
the 1930's indicated that the Borstal's were very successful, rehabilitating a claimed 70% of
trainees. See BARMAN, THE ENGLISH BORSTAL SYSTEM (1934); GiBBENS, PSYCHIATRIC STUDIES
OF BORSTAL LADS (1963); Wardner & Wilson, The British Borstal Training System, 64 J.
CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 118 (1973).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 5006(g) (1976).
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deal with the problems of these youths, the Act provides for the
segregation of the committed youth offenders, "insofar as practical," 2 so as to avoid the influence of association with the more
hardened inmates serving traditional criminal sentences."
In the actual process of sentencing, judges are given four options
under the Act. First, under section 5010(b), the judge can put a
youth offender on probation. Second, the judge can sentence the
offender to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment and
supervision until discharged by the Youth Division." This sentence is imposed in lieu of a definite term. A youth offender sentenced under this section may be released at any time, but must be
released with or without supervision upon expiration of four years
from the date of conviction, and unconditionally discharged upon
expiration of six years from the date of conviction.'"
The third sentencing option is available when a judge feels that
a youth would not derive the maximum benefit from treatment by
the Youth Division before expiration of six years from the date of
conviction. The Act allows the judge to sentence the youth offender to the custody of the Attorney General for any term of imprisonment authorized by the statute under which he was convicted.' Such a committed youth offender may be released at any
time by the Youth Division, but must be released under supervision no later than two years before the expiration of the term imposed by the court. The youth must be unconditionally discharged
12.

18 U.S.C. § 5011 (1976).

13. "If the court is of the opinion that the youth offender does not need commitment, it
may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the youth offender on probation." 18 U.S.C. § 5010(a) (1976).
14. If the court shall find that a convicted person is a youth offender, and the offense is punishable by imprisonment under applicable provisions of law other than
this subsection, the court may, in lieu of the penalty of imprisonment otherwise
provided by law, sentence the youth offender to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment and supervision pursuant to this chapter until discharged by
the Commission as provided in section 5017(c) of this chapter.
18 U.S.C. § 5010(b) (1976).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 5017(c) (1976).
16. If the court shall find that the youth offender may not be able to derive maximum benefit from treatment by the Commission prior to the expiration of six
years from the date of conviction it may, in lieu of the penalty of imprisonment
otherwise provided by law, sentence the youth offender to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment and supervision pursuant to this chapter for any
further period that may be authorized by law for the offense or offenses of which
he stands convicted or until discharged by the Commission as provided in section
5017(d) of this chapter.
18 U.S.C. § 5010(c) (1976).
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on or before expiration of the maximum term imposed.17 Finally, if
the judge finds that the youth will not derive benefit from treatment, he can sentence the youth offender under any other applicable penalty provision.' 8 In such a case, the offender would be eligible for parole and mandatory release, as would any adult offender.
The, Act reserves to the sentencing judge's discretion the decision as to whether or not an offender under age twenty-two will
benefit from treatment. In order to allow the judge to make the
most informed decision, however, the Act allows the judge to
gather additional information about the youth by ordering that he
be committed to the custody of the Attorney General for observation and study.' Following such an order, the Youth Division must
issue a report to the court within sixty days.
In keeping with the philosophy of treatment rather than punishment for youth offenders, the Act provides that if the offender is
discharged unconditionally before the expiration of the maximum
sentence, the conviction is automatically "set aside" and the offender is issued a certificate to that effect.2 0 When a youth offender
has been placed on probation, the court may in its discretion unconditionally discharge a youth offender from probation prior to
the end of the previously fixed term. Once again, the discharge automatically sets aside the conviction, and a certificate so stating is
issued.2
INTERPRETING THE REQUIREMENT OF TREATMENT UNDER THE

YCA

Prior Supreme Court Cases
Although Congress was clear about its policy of providing for
treatment and rehabilitation of youth offenders under the YCA,
Congress failed to give detailed specifications as to how the Act
should be implemented. As a consequence, courts have been re17. 18 U.S.C. § 5017(d) (1976).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 5010(d) (1976).
19. If the court desires additional information as to whether a youth offender will
derive benefit from treatment under subsections (b) or (c) it may order that he be
committed to the custody of the Attorney General for observation and study at an
appropriate classification center or agency. Within sixty days from the date of the
order, or such additional period as the court may grant, the Division shall report
to the court its findings.
18 U.S.C. § 5010(e) (1976).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 5021(a) (1976). There is conflict among the circuits as to the legal effect
of this "set aside" provision. Compare United States v. McMains, 540 F.2d 387 (8th Cir.
1976) with Doe v. Webster, 606 F.2d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 5021(b) (1976).
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quired to provide answers to some very practical questions about
how to treat youth offenders. One of these questions was answered
by the Supreme Court in Dorszynski v. United States.2 2 The Court
was asked in Dorszynski to interpret the requirement of section
5010(d)23 that a judge find the offender will not benefit from treatment. The Court first examined the legislative history of the Act,
and concluded that Congress had not intended to restrict the
broad discretion which is vested traditionally in the sentencing
judge. Based on this examination, the Court ruled that the statutory requirement of a "no benefit" finding is not a substantive
standard under which a judge must make a statement of the supporting reasons for his decision.2 ' Rather, the Court found, section
5010(d) is included to ensure that the judge is aware of the possibility of sentencing under the YCA. The section merely requires
that the judge make a clear finding that the youth will either benefit or not benefit from treatment. 6
In Durst v. United States, 6 decided four years after Dorszynski,
the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a judge could
require restitution or a fine or both when placing a youth offender
on probation under the YCA. After recognizing that section
5010(a) of the YCA neither granted nor withheld judicial authority
to impose restitution or a fine, the Court examined other sections
of the Act to see whether they included any references to penalty
options. The Court pointed to section 5023(a), which provides that
nothing in the Act shall affect the provisions of the general probation statute.' Noting that a provision of the probation statute 8
expressly provided that a defendant on probation could be required either to pay a fine or to make restitution, the Court in
Durst concluded that such sentencing alternatives were also available under the YCA. 9

22. 418 U.S. 424 (1974), appeal on remand, United States v. Dorszynski, 524 F.2d 190
(7th Cir. 1975).
23.

18 U.S.C. § 5010(d) (1976).

24.

418 U.S. at 441.

25.

Id. at 442-44.

26.

434 U.S. 542 (1978).

27.

Id. at 549.

28.

18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976).

29.

434 U.S. at 555.
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Ralston v. Robinson
In Ralston v.Robinson,3" the Supreme Court was again required
to address a circumstance not expressly provided for in the YCA.
The Court was asked to decide whether a youth offender sentenced
to a consecutive adult term of imprisonment while serving a sentence under the YCA must receive YCA treatment for the remainder of his youth sentence. The Supreme Court, in an opinion delivered by Justice Marshall, held that the YCA does not require such
treatment.3 '
Factual Background
John Carroll Robinson was seventeen-years-old when he pleaded
guilty to a charge of second degree murder.3 After being sentenced
under section 5010(c) of the YCA to a ten-year term of imprisonment, Robinson was placed at the Kennedy Youth Center in Morgantown, West Virginia, on the sentencing judge's recommendation. Robinson's release was dependent on two conditions:
attainment of at least an eighth grade level of education, and the
successful completion of training in a trade of his choice. In addition, the sentencing judge recommended that Robinson receive
weekly individual therapy. Before release, Robinson was to undergo psychological reevaluation.
A year after his murder conviction, Robinson was found guilty of
assaulting a federal officer while incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution at Ashland, Kentucky. For this conviction he
was sentenced by the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Kentucky to serve an additional ten-year adult sentence. The court stated that "the defendant will not benefit any
further under the provisions of the [YCA]" and, therefore, "decline[d] to sentence under said Act."33 After a review of the
presentence report, however, the judge reduced the sentence to
sixty-six months. This new sentence was to be served consecutively
to the YCA sentence. Finally, the judge recommended that a facility providing greater security would be more appropriate for
30. 102 S. Ct. 233 (1981).
31. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Burger,
and Justices White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist joined. Justice Powell filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Brennan and O'Connor joined.
32. Robinson was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 111, 1114.
33. 102 S. Ct. at 237.
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Robinson than the Kentucky institution. 34

Following this 1975 conviction and sentencing, Robinson was
transferred to the Federal Correctional Institution in Oxford, Wisconsin. Because of disciplinary problems, Robinson was later
placed in a federal facility in Lompoc, California. In 1977, Robinson pleaded guilty to a charge of assaulting a federal officer while
confined in the Lompoc institution. He was sentenced under 18
U.S.C. § 5010(d) of the YCA as an adult, to a term of one year and
one day to run consecutive to and not concurrent with the term he
was then serving. The Bureau of Prisons classified Robinson as an
adult after he received this second adult sentence. Consequently,
he was no longer segregated from adult prisoners.3 5 Robinson was
transferred to the United States Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana, and, after accumulating numerous misconduct reports,36 was
sent to the United States
Penitentiary at Marion, Illinois, a maxi7
mum security facility.

Robinson filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Illinois on May 25,
1978. After reviewing the petition, the United States magistrate
recommended that Robinson be transferred to an institution where
he would be segregated from adult offenders and would receive
treatment as prescribed by section 5011 of the YCA.3 s The district
court then issued an order granting the writ of habeas corpus, and
on June 17, 1980, Robinson was transferred from Marion to the
Federal Correctional Institution at Memphis, Tennessee. The government appealed from the district court's order, and the order
was subsequently stayed. Robinson, in turn, appealed the stay of
the order. The appeals were consolidated before the United States

34. Id.
35. Robinson contended that he had never been segregated from non-YCA prisoners nor
given any special YCA treatment as mandated by the original sentencing judge. Petitioner's
Brief at 7. The Court, however, did not address this issue. 102 S. Ct. at 237 n.2.
36. The Bureau of Prisons reported that from the time of his incarceration in July, 1974
through July, 1980, Robinson had been cited in 36 incident reports, many for violent conduct. Brief for the Petitioner at 6 n.6, Ralston v. Robinson, 102 S. Ct. 233 (1981).
37. Institutions in the federal prison system have been grouped into security levels based
on seven factors: 1) perimeter security, 2) towers, 3) external patrol, 4) detection devices, 5)
security of housing areas, 6) type of living quarters and 7) level of staffing per population
size. Level one is the lowest in security and level six is the highest. Marion is a level six

facility. United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois & the Bar Association of
the Seventh Federal Circuit, Manual Prepared for Seminar on the Federal Sentencing Process (Oct. 31, 1981) 170, 178 [hereinafter cited as Seminar, Federal Sentencing].
38. Report and Recommendation of Kenneth J. Meyers, United States Magistrate, August 23, 1979.
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Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
. The Seventh Circuit Decision
The Seventh Circuit affirmed,3 9 holding that Robinson must be
treated pursuant to the YCA until the termination of his YCAimposed sentence. In reaching this conclusion, the court first noted
that the YCA contained no provision authorizing a YCA sentence
to be reevaluated by another judge. The court then turned to the
statutory language of the YCA, the pertinent legislative history,
40
and the Supreme Court's decision in Dorszynski v. United States
for guidance. The court concluded that all of these sources were
consistent in emphasizing the YCA's rehabilitative purpose.
Next, the court noted that both the legislative history and the
Dorszynski decision emphasized that "[s]entencing a youth offender under the YCA does not deprive the court of any of its present function as to sentencing. "41 The Seventh Circuit reasoned
that to interpret the Act so as to allow a second judge, while sentencing on a totally unrelated matter, to reevaluate the original
YCA sentence would deprive the first judge of his traditionally exclusive sentencing function. The court refused to mandate such a
departure from tradition in the absence of clear congressional expression. In his concurring opinion, Judge Pell noted that while
there was nothing in the record to indicate that "either Robinson
or society will benefit by continuing the YCA treatment, '4 the
continuing treatment was mandated by the statute.
In addition to preserving the sentencing judge's discretion to
utilize the YCA, the Seventh Circuit also rejected the Bureau of
Prisons' contention that the Bureau should have authority under
section 5011 to decide whether a prisoner serving a YCA sentence
but facing a consecutive adult sentence should be confined as an
adult. In construing the language of section 5011 which requires
segregation of youth offenders "in so far as practical," the court
agreed with a Third Circuit decision, Thompson v. Carlson,'
where the same issue concerning the Bureau's confinement deter39. Robinson v. Ralston, 642 F.2d 1077 (7th Cir.), rev'd and remanded sub noma.Ralston
v. Robinson, 102 S. Ct. 233 (1981). The opinion was written by Judge Swygert and joined in
by Judge Wisdom, Senior Circuit Judge for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation. Judge
Pell concurred and filed a separate opinion.
40. 418 U.S. 424 (1974).
41. .642 F.2d at 1080 (citations omitted).
42. Id. (Pell, J., concurring).
43. 624 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1980).
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mination was raised and rejected. The court quoted with approval
the following language from the Thompson decision:
If we were to so construe the statute, we would expand considerably the power given to the Bureau of Prisons by vesting in it that
which Congress has given exclusively to the judiciary, i.e., the determination whether the offender can benefit under the YCA.We
find no statutory basis or policy reason for such a construction. 4
In Thompson, a seventeen-year-old received an eight-year sentence under section 5010(c) of the YCA. 4 5 While incarcerated
under the YCA sentence, he was convicted of first degree murder
as a result of his participation in the stabbing of a fellow inmate.
Thompson was then sentenced to a consecutive adult term of life
imprisonment after the sentencing judge made a specific finding
that Thompson would not derive further benefit under the YCA. 4"
The Seventh Circuit, however, disagreed with the Third Circuit's
disposition of the treatment issue in Thompson. The Third Circuit
had held that a prisoner who was given a consecutive adult sentence while serving a YCA sentence could be returned to the general prison population if the judge made a specific finding that the
prisoner would no longer benefit from treatment under the Act.'7
According to the Thompson court, "the YCA statute itself expressly recognizes that there can be judicial reevaluation during
the service of the YCA sentence."' 8 It provides, for example, that
nothing in the Act "shall limit or affect the power of any court to
suspend the imposition or execution of any sentence and place a
youth offender on probation."'49 The court reasoned that "it would
not be inconsistent with the statutory scheme to hold that a judicial reevaluation of the continued benefit of commitment as a YCA
offender is permissible when such a reevaluation is triggered by the
offender's own commission of a crime" 50 and where the second
judge is thus making a "no benefit" finding on the basis of newly
available information.
A contrary construction of the YCA,according to the Third Circuit in Thompson, would lead to a futile result. Under sections

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

642 F.2d at 1082 (citations omitted).
18 U.S.C. § 5010(c) (1976).
624 F.2d at 416.
Id. at 419, 422.
624 F.2d at 421 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 5023 (1976)).
18 U.S.C. § 5023 (1976).
624 F.2d at 421-22.
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5017(b) and (c) of the YCA, all YCA offenders must be conditionally discharged for at least two years before the end of their sentence. It would be "patently impossible" to satisfy this requirement in Thompson's case, however, because imposition of the
consecutive life sentence meant that he would not be eligible for
release until he had served ten years of the life sentence."' The
court thus concluded that "this provides further indication that
the concern of the statute is toward those prisoners who will be
released following the YCA sentence," 2 and that the rehabilitative
purpose of the YCA could not be met in this case.
The Seventh Circuit's decision that Robinson be treated as a
youth until the expiration of his YCA sentence was also at odds
8 In Outing,
with the Fourth Circuit's decision in Outing v. Bell.5
the Fourth Circuit held that a prisoner who was sentenced to a
consecutive adult term after initially being imprisoned under a
YCA sentence did not fall within the definition of a YCA inmate
under prison regulations," and that mandatory segregation from
the adult prison population was not required by the wording of the
YCA. 55 Because the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the YCA
treatment provisions was in opposition to the approaches taken
previously by two other circuits, the United States Supreme Court
in 1981 granted certiorari in Ralston. "
The Supreme Court Decision
In resolving the conflict among the circuits, the United States
Supreme Court relied principally on its own prior interpretation of
the YCA in Dorszynski v. United States.57 The Ralston Court observed initially that its previous examination of the history, structure, and underlying policies of the YCA had uncovered two relevant tenets: "the YCA strongly endorses the discretionary power of
a judge to choose among available sentencing options" and "the
YCA prescribes certain basic conditions of treatment for YCA
51.
52.
53.
54.

624 F.2d at 422 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) (1976)).
Id. at 422.
632 F.2d 1144 (4th Cir. 1980).
Under the operative policy statement 7300.136 of the National Bureau of Prisons, a

YCA inmate was defined as an inmate sentenced under the YCA "who is not also sentenced
to a concurrent or consecutive adult term, whether state or federal." Id. at 1146.

55.

Id.

56.
57.

452 U.S. 960 (1981).
418 U.S. 424 (1974).
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offenders." 58
The Court's analysis of the YCA in prior cases and in Ralston
led to the following sequence of conclusions. First, the Court noted
that the YCA prescribes an individualized treatment program requiring that youth offenders be segregated from adults and that
they receive rehabilitative treatment.59 Second, the purpose of this
treatment is to prevent youths from becoming hardened criminals
by keeping them away from those youths and adults with few prospects of rehabilitation." Third, whether to use the particular treatment methods of the YCA depends on the exclusive decision of the
sentencing judge.61 Finally, when some of the traditional authority
of prison officials to moderate confinement conditions was withdrawn by Congress, Congress did not intend that no one exercise
the authority.6 In the Court's words, "[tihe only reasonable conclusion is that Congress reposed that authority in the court, the
institution that the YCA explicitly invests with the discretion to
make the original decision about basic treatment conditions."6
To bolster these conclusions, the Court pointed to the fact that
the YCA does permit a youth offender originally sentenced under
the YCA to be treated later as an adult in certain situations. As an
example, the Court noted that under the YCA a court may sentence a defendant to an adult term if the defendant has committed
an adult offense after receiving a suspended sentence and probation as a youth under section 5010(a).4 In addition, a judge may
impose a concurrent adult sentence on an adult offender serving a
YCA term."6 Finally, the YCA provides that any conditional release may be revoked and an adult sentence immediately imposed
if the youthful offender violates the terms of the release by committing a crime. This is true even if the youth sentence has not yet
expired."
The Court concluded that "a judge who sentences a youth offender to a consecutive adult term may require that the offender
58.

102 S. Ct. 233, 237 (1981).

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

102 S. Ct. at 242.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 242-43.
Id. at 243.
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also serve the remainder of his youth sentence as an adult. ' ' 6 7 The

standards to be applied "in determining whether an offender will
obtain further benefit from YCA treatment," according to the
Court, are no different from those applied in imposing a YCA sentence originally.e" A judge should make a sentencing decision "informed by both the rehabilitative purposes of the YCA and the
realistic circumstances of the offender."" Applying these principles
to the facts in Ralston, the Court found that the second judge
made a sufficient finding that Robinson "would not benefit from
YCA treatment during the remainder of his youth term.

' 70

The

Court emphasized, however, that in the future judges would be required to make an explicit "no benefit" finding in such a
situation. 1
ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION

In Ralston v. Robinson,7 the Supreme Court was faced with
resolving a difficult policy issue: what should be done with youthful
offenders who are not being rehabilitated through YCA treatment
programs? The majority answered this question in the most practical way possible, that is, by preserving the broad discretion of subsequent judges to sentence YCA offenders to consecutive adult
sentences. While such a decision may be satisfying in its practicality, the Court's decision is nevertheless an unwarranted act of legislation. In addition, the Supreme Court's interpretation may permit violations of the offenders' constitutional rights to equal
protection of the laws and to protection against double
punishment.
Normally, when confronted with a question of statutory construction, the Supreme Court looks to the intent of Congress in
enacting the statute for the answer.7 8 But in resolving the issues
raised in Ralston, traditional rules of statutory construction are
not especially helpful. Congress did not specifically address the

67. Id.
68. Id. at 244.
69. Id.
70. Id. The Court noted that the court of appeals apparently "believed that a rehabilita.tive purpose may have existed here. However, given the facts of this case, any such belief is
sheer speculation." Id. at 243 n.11.
71. Id. at 244. The second judge in this case merely stated that Robinson would not
benefit "further" under the YCA. Id.
72. 102 S. Ct. 233 (1981).
73. 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUTON § 45.05 (1973).
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problem of how to treat youthful offenders who commit additional
crimes while serving their YCA sentence.
Despite the fact that the statutory language and the legislative
history of the YCA provide no clear answer to the Ralston problem, the Supreme Court was not totally without guidance. Rather
than refusing to decide the issue by ruling, in effect, that the YCA
does not apply to subsequently convicted YCA-sentenced offenders, the Court could have examined the broad legislative purpose
underlying the statute. 4
There is support for the view that a statute should not be confined in its operation to only what was within the contemplation
or intention of the legislature which enacted it, but that, instead,
the words of a statute should be regarded as embodying a kind of
delegation of authority to exercise responsible creative judgment
in relating the statutory concept, spirit, purpose, or policy to
5
changing needs of society.7
Professor Robert E. Keeton has suggested that courts engaging
in such an analysis of legislative purpose follow a four-step process
to resolve statutory construction problems:
First: Apply the mandate of the statute if it appears that the legislature did in fact both consider and prescribe for the problem
at hand.
Second: If the problem falls beyond the core area that the legislature both considered and prescribed for, defer to the legislature's manifested determinations of principle and policy to the
extent they can be ascertained and are relevant to the problem
at hand.,
Third: Subject to the obligations to apply the legislature's mandate and defer to its manifestations of principle and policy, resolve the problem at hand in a way that in the court's view
produces the best total set of rules, including those within the
core area of the statute and other cognate rules of law,
whatever their source.
Fourth: In deciding the scope of both the legislature's mandate
and its manifestations of principle and policy, appraise the
available evidence candidly and without resort to contrary-tofact presumptions; employ a rebuttable presumption that the
legislature is ordinarily clear about its considered mandates,
leaving courts to act in accordance with the second and third

74.

Id. at

75.

Id.

§ 45.09.

19821

Sentencing Under the YCA
guidelines with respect to questions it does not clearly answer .7

Applying Keeton's model to the instant case both highlights the
weaknesses in the majority's reasoning and demonstrates how the
Court has gone beyond its proper role by usurping the legislative
function under the guise of interpretation."
Judicial Legislation
The majority in Ralston initially followed Keeton's model, first,
by recognizing that the problem fell beyond the core area of the
statute and, second, by deferring to Congress's manifested determinations of principle and policy to the extent they were ascertainable and were relevant. Two legislative goals of the YCA were
identified by the Ralston majority: the continuation of the power
of the sentencing judge to choose among sentencing options, and
the opportunities for treatment of YCA offenders. This conclusion
is consistent with the criterion in the second step of Keeton's
model: these two purposes are clearly relevant and there is sufficient legislative history to support the majority's conclusion that
these are the basic principles underlying the YCA.
The majority cannot resolve satisfactorily the issue in Ralston,
however, because the Court was satisfied in identifying only these
two basic principles. But the principles are inconsistent. As a result of recognizing the judge's broad sentencing discretion, the
Court limits the YCA offender's right to treatment. Conversely, by
requiring the maintenance of YCA treatment, the Court limits the
sentencing judge's discretion.
The majority should have resolved the conflict in Ralston by following Professor Keeton's third proposition. In essence, he maintains that subject to any obligation to defer to legislative manifestations of principle and policy, a court should "resolve the problem
of interpretation in a way that produces . . . the best total set of
rules . . . . ,7 The decision in Ralston, however, does not meet
this test. The majority's decision conflicts with the traditional
76. R. KEETON, VENTURING
cited as KEETON].

TO

Do JusTicE 94-95 (1969) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter

77. As the Supreme Court has explained: "While the judicial function in construing legislation is not a mechanical process from which judgment is excluded, it is nevertheless very
different from the legislative function. Construction is not legislation and must avoid 'that
retrospective expansion of meaning which properly deserves the stigma of judicial legislation.'" Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 618 (1944) (quoting Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 522 (1942)).
78. KEErON, supra note 76, at 94-95.
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common law rule that a sentencing court has the authority, during
the same term of court, to change an imposed term of imprisonment but not to increase a sentence once it has become final." As
Justice Stevens pointed out in his Ralston dissent, the Supreme

Court has recognized consistently that a court may amend a sentence so as to mitigate the punishment but not so as to increase
it.o Although it is not clear whether such a result is constitutionally mandated, a court is apparently without authority to increase
the term of imprisonment after revoking probation."
79. United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 306 (1931). In Benz, the defendant was indicted
for violation of the National Prohibition Act. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 10 months. While imprisoned and before expiration of the term of
the federal district court which imposed the sentence, the court entered an order reducing
the sentence to six months. The issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether the
district court had the power to amend the sentence by shortening it. The Court held, as a
general rule, that judgments, decrees, and orders were within the control of the district
court during the term at which they were made, and as a result were subject to being
amended, modified, or vacated by the district court. However, the Court stated that in criminal cases the punishment may not be increased or augmented. In Benz, since the power of
the court was exercised to mitigate the punishment, not to increase it, it was brought within
the limitation.
The distinction between mitigating a punishment and increasing it is based on the fact
that to increase the penalty would subject the defendant to double punishment for the same
offense in violation of the fifth amendment: "For of what avail is the constitutional protection against more than one trial if there can be any number of sentences pronounced on the
same verdict?" Id. at 308. See also ABA STANDAws, SmerzrcNI
DUrSS § 6.1(b) (Final Draft, Sept. 1968).

ALTERNATrV

AND PRocs-

80. 102 S. Ct. 233, 246 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81. Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 266-67 (1943). In Roberts, the defendant was
sentenced to two years and fined $250.00. Pursuant to the Probation Act operative in 1943,
the district court suspended the execution of the sentence and ordered defendant's release
on probation for a five-year period. Approximately four years later, the court held a hearing
and revoked the original sentence of two years, and imposed a new sentence of three years.
The issues presented to the Supreme Court were: (1) whether the Probation Act authorized
a sentence imposed before probation, the execution of which has been suspended, to be set
aside and increased upon revocation of probation, and (2) if construed to grant such a
power, did the Act violate the prohibition against double jeopardy? The Court did not reach
the second issue. 320 U.S. at 265.
The Court began with the assumption that the district court's authority to suspend or
increase a sentence fixed by a valid judgment must be derived from the Probation Act itself
since the federal courts had no such power prior to the passage of the Act. At § 725, the
Probation Act provides that "the court may revoke the probation or the suspension of sentence and, may impose any sentence which might originally have been imposed." Id. at 266
(citations omitted). Although the government argued that the language of this last phrase
gave the courts the power to impose a new sentence after revocation of probation to the
extent of what could have been imposed originally, the court refused to give such an expansive reading to the Act. Instead, the Court held that, when read in the context of the entire
Act, the phrase meant that Congress merely conferred upon the lower court a choice between imposing sentence before probation is awarded, or after probation is revoked. It did
not afford the court the power to set aside a valid judgment and increase the sentence after
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Possible Equal Protection Violations

The majority's decision in Ralston v. Robinson also creates a situation where the sentencing procedure may violate a youth offender's rights under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Courts have uniformly upheld past challenges to the
constitutionality of the YCA's provisions which permit youth offenders to be confined for longer periods than they would be subject to confinement as adults."2 These courts have agreed with the

revocation of probation.
The exceptions to the general rule that a court is without authority to increase the term
of imprisonment after revoking probation have been developed for criminal cases in which
the original conviction and sentence are set aside and a more severe sentence is imposed
following retrial and reconviction, North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), or where a
reviewing court imposes a more severe sentence under a statute which gives the government
an explicit right to appeal. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980). The exceptions are not relevant to this case where there was no retrial and where there is no explicit
grant of statutory authority to modify the original sentence.
Absent explicit statutory authority, the government has no right to appeal in a criminal
case. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978). In United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S.
117 (1980), however, the Court held that where a statute did accord the government such a
right, there was no violation of the double jeopardy clause when the reviewing court imposed a more severe sentence on appeal. In this case, the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970 authorized the imposition of an increased sentence upon a convicted dangerous special
offender (18 U.S.C. § 3575(b)) and granted the United States the right, under specified conditions, to take that sentence to the Court of Appeals for review (18 U.S.C. § 3576). The
Court upheld the constitutionality of this latter provision. Examining the series of cases
interpreting the double jeopardy clause, the Court concluded that the considerations which
bar reprosecution after an acquittal do not prohibit review of a sentence: a limited right of
appeal does not subject the defendant to the embarrassment and anxiety that are associated
with repeated attempts to reconvict. Moreover, the double jeopardy clause does not provide
the defendant with the right to know at any specific moment in time what the exact limit of
his punishment will turn out to be. The Court characterized as dictum the language in
United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304 (1931), which quoted from Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163
(1874) to the effect that the practice of barring an increase in sentence by the trial court
after service of the sentence is constitutionally based, and stated that the dictum in Benz
should be confined to Lange's specific context, where the trial court erroneously imposed a
greater sentence than the legislature had authorized. 449 U.S. at 138.
The Roberts case is most closely analogous to the instant case in that it interpreted the
sentencing court's power under the Probation Act, an act similar in nature to the YCA in
that it is designed to "provide an individualized program offering a young or unhardened
offender an opportunity to rehabilitate himself. . . . To accomplish this basic purpose Congress vested wide discretion in the courts." 320 U.S. at 272. In contrast, DiFrancesco
presents a case where Congress had drafted a sentencing provision to attack a specific problem (the tendency of some judges to mete out light sentences in cases involving organized
crime management personnel) which was "limited in scope and.. . narrowly focused on the
problem so identified." 449 U.S. at 142.
82. See, e.g., McGann v. United States, 440 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1971); Guidry v. United
States, 433 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1970); Johnson v. United States, 374 F.2d 966 (4th Cir. 1967).
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Fifth Circuit's reasoning8 that the YCA's provision for treatment
is not a heavier penalty but actually a benefit that allows the youth
offender "the opportunity to escape from the physical and psychological shocks and traumas attendant upon serving an ordinary penal sentence . . . . .8"In a later case, 5 the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals expanded this concept by stating that the basic
theory of the Act is rehabilitative and that "this rehabilitation may
be regarded as comprising the quid pro quo for a longer confinement but under different conditions and terms than a defendant
would undergo in an ordinary prison."" Under the Ralston majority's interpretation of the YCA, however, youth offenders are now
subject to incarceration in an ordinary prison for a longer period
of time than if sentenced as adults. This result eliminates any quid
pro quo argument. As the dissent notes, the youth offender also
loses the good time allowances available to offenders sentenced as
adults.8 7
The Ralston majority recognizes the equal protection problem,
but concludes that because Robinson was sentenced under section
5010(c) and not under section 5010(b), the problem need not be
addressed." The majority merely notes that "[w]e assume that dis-

83. Cunningham v. United States, 256 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1958) (defendant pleaded guilty
to a charge of theft of a clock radio in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 661, a misdemeanor providing
for a maximum sentence of one year, but was sentenced instead to an indeterminate sentence under § 5010(b) of the YCA).
84. Id. at 472.
85. Carter v. United States, 306 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The defendant originally
pleaded not guilty to a four-count indictment charging housebreaking and grand larceny.
The sentence for housebreaking was two to 15 years, D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 22-1801(b) (West
1967), and the sentence for grand larceny was one to 10 years, D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 22-2201
(West 1967). Carter later withdrew the not guilty plea and pleaded guilty to petty larceny, a
misdemeanor with a maximum one-year sentence. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 22-2202 (West
1967).
86. 306 F.2d at 285.
87. 102 S. Ct. 233, 251 (1981). In support of the observation that youth offenders lose
good time allowances available to adult offenders, the dissent cites the following cases:
Staudmier v. United States, 496 F.2d 1191, 1192 (10th Cir. 1974); Hale v. United States, 307
F. Supp. 345, 346 (D. Okla. 1970); Foote v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 627, 628-29 (D. Nev.
1969). Id. at 251 n.17.
88. The majority in Ralston stated:
We need not address the question whether a judge may modify the basic treatment terms of a youth sentence whose length exceeds the maximum penalty authorized by law for an adult, since respondent's YCA sentence was imposed under
§ 5010(c), not § 5010(b). We recognize that if the basic treatment elements of a
YCA sentence under § 5010(b) are modified at such a time that a youth effectively
serves an adult sentence of greater length than an adult could receive, there would
be a serious issue whether such a sentence is authorized by any statute and, if so,
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trict judges will keep these considerations in mind when deciding
whether to modify YCA treatment terms of a sentence imposed
under section 5010(b)." 89 Concerning sentencing under section
5010(c), the majority responds by stating that "whether respondent's sentence was longer than he would have received as an adult
is speculation.

.

.

. "9 However, the majority ignores the fact that

a youth can now actually be sentenced under section 5010(c) to a
longer sentence than he could receive as an adult, and that its decision gives a second sentencing judge the power to require the
youth to serve that longer sentence "under the adult conditions he
paid a price to avoid."9' 1
The Proper Approach
The fourth of Keeton's propositions suggests that the majority
should have interpreted the YCA by appraising the available evidence candidly and without resort to any contrary fact presumptions. Available evidence from the legislative history of the YCA
points out that Congress's overriding concern was with providing
treatment for youth offenders. Indeed, the language of the bill
which became the YCA focused almost exclusively on a discussion
of the English Borstal systems' and on the need to provide such
treatment for youth offenders in this country.
Congressional views about judicial discretion when implementing
or refusing to implement the YCA are much less clear. Not only
did Congress fail completely to mention what authority a second
judge would have in imposing an adult sentence on a youth currently serving a YCA sentence, the legislative history also contains
almost no language dealing with any aspect of judicial discretion.
For example, the only reference to judicial discretion in the YCA
bill states that "the power of the court to grant probation is left
undisturbed by the bill."93 Moreover, in the only hearing held on
the bill the observation was made that:
The act.

. .

does not interfere with the power of the judge [with

respect to sentencing] but gives him merely an alternative
whether it violates the Equal Protection Clause.
102 S. Ct. at 244 n.13.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 251 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
93. H.R. REp. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950 U.S.

3985.

CODE CONG.

& AD. Nzws 3983,
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method of treatment of those people . . He may still give the
youth offender the punishment prescribed by existing statutes,
there is nothing in the bill that prevents that. All that the bill
does is to provide that if in his judgment and discretion, he
thinks that the offender before the court is one that can be
treated with advantage under this bill, he can sentence him under
94
this bill instead of under existing law ....
Even this testimony from the congressional hearing on the YCA
suggests that the sentencing judge's options are framed in terms of
the treatment objective.
In contrast to this single reference to judicial discretion is the
frequent testimony supporting the rehabilitative purpose of the
bill. Testimony on this aspect of the bill included the following
statements:
By Judge Laws:
That is precisely what this bill does and accomplishes. It makes
possible the turning over of these adolescents, many of whom are
physically or mentally sick, to a classification center where they
may be studied extensively by any number of individuals and put
in places of imprisonment or restraint where they can be rehabilitated and built up.96
By James Bennett:
From the hundreds of cases of this type which have come across
my desk I have formed the conclusion that in the task of correcting the offender the crucial element is 'that of time. Attitudes,
habits, interests, standards cannot be changed overnight."
By Judge Phillips:
Again, reliable statistics demonstrate, with reasonable certainty,
that existing methods of treatment of criminally inclined youths
are not solving the problem. A large percentage of those released
from our reformatories and penal institutions return to antisocial
conduct and ultimately become hardened criminals. . . . S. 2609
is designed to provide methods and means that will effect such
rehabilitation and develop normality. It is not experimental. It is
based on the principles and procedures provided under what is

94. Testimony of Chief Judge John J. Parker of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, Hearings on S. 1114 and S. 2609, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 43-44 (1949).
95. Testimony of Chief Judge Bolitha J. Laws of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia, id. at 12.
96. Testimony of James V. Bennett, Director, Bureau of Prisons, id. at 27.
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known as the Borstal system in England, which has been in successful operation since 1794.
The underlying theory of the bill is to substitute for retributive
punishment methods of training and treatment designed to correct and prevent antisocial tendencies. It departs from the mere
punitive idea of dealing with criminals
and looks primarily to the
7
objective idea of rehabilitation.0
By John Ellingston:
The stories that I have told you indicate a little bit how a youth
authority-how this program, because of the flexibility of handling-will function. I think I can use the California set-up as an
illustration pointing out as I go along, how it will fit into the existing Federal set-up-the highly creditable penal system-under
Mr. Bennett.
The first thing you have to do under a treatment approach
which is a scientific approach and not a mollycoddle approach, is
diagnosis. You have had the nature of this diagnosis explained to
you. 9

By Donald Counihan:
Father Flanagan of Boy's Town once said, "There is no such
thing as a bad boy." There are, no doubt, some social workers and
criminologists who would dispute this statement but whether it is
correct or not, one thing is certain, proper guidance and wise
counseling after a slip by a genuine youth offender, not the real
criminal type, can do wonders in salvaging that life. Father Flanagan by his well-planned program has proved this."
If the Court had followed Keeton's model it would have made a
more comprehensive and candid appraisal of this available evidence to resolve the conflict between the policy of providing treatment for youthful offenders and the policy of maintaining judicial
discretion. Keeton's fourth step, the "rebuttable presumption that
the legislature is ordinarily clear about its considered mandates," 1 would have required the majority to interpret the YCA
so as to give preference to the policy of treatment over that of preserving judicial discretion. In so doing, the majority would have
97. Testimony of Chief Judge Orie L. Phillips, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, id. at 60.
98. Testimony of John R. Ellingston, Special Adviser on Youth Authority Program,
American Law Institute, id. at 74.
99. Testimony by Donald M. Counihan, Attorney at Law, Washington, D.C., id. at 79.
100.

See KzvroN, supra note 76, at 95.
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affirmed the Seventh Circuit's decision, which had held that despite his subsequent sentencing as an adult, Robinson had to be
treated pursuant to the YCA until the termination of his YCAimposed sentence.
CONCLUSION

The majority's decision in Ralston v. Robinson interpreting the
YCA is inconsistent with basic principles of statutory construction.
In attempting to answer a question which the legislature did not
address, the majority tries to apply two inconsistent principles underlying the Act. Its final decision, however, ignores the principle
which is most basic of all: the YCA's goal of providing treatment
for youth offenders. In addition, the majority's decision arguably
raises a number of constitutional problems.
Many, however, will applaud the decision as providing a much
needed result. The decision will be welcomed as consistent with
both the trend to treat violent juvenile offenders as adults"' and
the prevailing correctional philosophy which has rejected the rehabilitative model of diagnosing, treating, and curing offenders." 2
The decision also recognizes the practical realities of the administration of the penitentiary system. The Bureau of Prisons no
longer maintains separate institutions for younger offenders. Instead, younger offenders are assigned to the same institutions as
older offenders under a general policy of assigning each offender to
an institution of the lowest security level consistent with adequate
supervision.103 Unless they qualify for minimum custody institu101. For example, under legislation recently enacted in Illinois, juveniles under 17 years
of age who are charged with committing a number of violent crimes are automatically transferred from juvenile court to adult court. The decision to impose automatic waiver procedures on certain categories of youthful offenders has also been pursued in Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, New York, and Vermont.
See also Roysher & Edelman, Treat Juveniles as Adults in New York: What Does it
Mean and How is it Working, in HALL, et al., MAJOR ISSUES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE INFORMATION AND TRAINING: READINGS IN PUBLIC POLICY

(1981); Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative

Reform and the Serious Young Offender: Dismantling the "RehabilitativeIdeal," 65 MINN.
L. REV. 167, 171 n.14 (1981); Sorrentino & Olsen, Certification of Juveniles to Adult Court,
4 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 497 (1977); Susmann, Practitioner'sGuide to Changes in Juvenile
Law and Procedure, 14 CriM. L. BULL. 311 (1978).
102. See N. MoRRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 17-20 (1974); OFFICE OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE
ADMIN., DELINQUENCY PREVENTION: THEORIES AND STRATEGIES (1979) [hereinafter cited as
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION]; Chase, Questioning the Juvenile Commitment: Some Notes on

Method and Consequence, 8 IND. L. REV. 373 (1974).
103. Seminar, Federal Sentencing, supra note 37, at 86.
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tions, offenders sentenced under the Youth Corrections Act are assigned to separate residential units within institutions and are assigned only to institutions that have such units.104 While courts
have ruled that a youth offender may not be placed in the general
adult population of a federal penitentiary,10 5 they have upheld this
practice, stating that the YCA requirement under section 5011 of
segregation "insofar as practical" allows the Bureau of Prisons to
establish a youth offender facility within the walks of a penitentiary if it otherwise complied with the treatment and segregation
requirements of the YCA. 06
The reality, however, is that youth offenders are not effectively
segregated from the adult prison population. Moreover, they do
not receive the wide range of educational and vocational programs
envisaged when the Act was passed.1 0 7 Under these conditions, the
Act cannot be regarded as truly rehabilitative. In the words of one
judge:
As for rehabilitation, it is extremely doubtful that two of the chosen means of the Act-§§ 5010(b) and 5010(c)-any longer serve
their purpose, if they ever did. Many, if not most, of the youths
committed to custody under § 5010(b) are in exactly the same
institutions, and under precisely the same conditions, as adults
who have been imprisoned, regardless of whether the principal
aim of the sentencing judge was deterrence, separation, retribution, or rehabilitation. We do not need scholars to tell us that
rehabilitation is an uncommon product of incarceration in such
large fortresses. An imaginatively designed probation sentence
will usually be far more rehabilitative to a young offender than
confinement for possibly four years under § 5010(b) or eight years
under § 5010(c). To say that a fine or a short jail sentence imposed as condition of probation is punitive and retributive in
comparison to youth offender commitment which is "rehabilitative," strikes me as jurisprudence by label and the height of
unrealism. 10'
104. Id. (citing U.S. Bureau of Prisons, Program Statement 51001.1 § 9, at 3 (1980)).
105. See, e.g., Brown v. Carlson, 431 F. Supp. 755 (W.D. Wis. 1977); United States v.
Alsbrook, 336 F. Supp. 973 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
106. United States v. Dancy, 510 F.2d 779, (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded sub
nom. United States ex rel. Dancy v. Arnold, 572 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1978) (rejecting the argument that youth offenders must be segregated from other offenders at all times).
107. The only difference in the YCA residential units and those for adult offenders is
that the YCA units have more staff assigned, including counseling staff. Educational and
vocational training opportunities for YCA inmates do not differ from those offered to other
inmates. See Seminar, Federal Sentencing, supra.note 37, at 86.
108. United States v. Marron, 564 F.2d 867, 873 (9th Cir. 1977) (Burns, J., dissenting)
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In light of these facts, it is easy to agree that a second judge
ought to be able to sentence someone like Robinson to serve an
adult sentence. As the Bureau of Prisons argued before the Seventh Circuit, "requiring [Robinson] to be treated according to the
terms of the YCA for the duration of the YCA sentence is a futile
act"1 9 because there was almost no treatment from which he
would benefit and because it seemed highly unlikely that he would
benefit further from the treatment that was available."'
The solution to this problem, however, is not the responsibility
of the United States Supreme Court. Its implicit assumptions
about the futility of requiring the treatment may be correct, but
the data to support these assumptions are not a part of the evidence which is available for the Court to consider. Such data is

(footnotes omitted).
The issue in Marron concerned whether the court could revoke probation in a case where
the original YCA sentence was split between time and probation and the offender had violated the terms of probation. The majority found it unnecessary to reach the revocation
issue, ruling that the original sentence was illegal and that the court could therefore correct
it by imposing a legal sentence under § 5010(b) of the YCA. Judge Burns dissented, agreeing
that the first sentence was illegal, but noting that imposing a new sentence under § 5010(b)
would result in the defendant serving a longer sentence than originally imposed, thereby
violating his constitutional rights under the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment.
109. 642 F.2d at 1082 (7th Cir. 1981).
110. In reaching its decision that YCA treatment must be continued, the Seventh Circuit
hypothesized that Robinson could benefit in the following ways:
As Judge Adams stated in his persuasive dissent in Thompson v. Carlson,
[Ilt may be that a youth who goes through a period of treatment in a youth
correction center would be less susceptible to the influences of hardened
criminals during his subsequent confinement than one not so treated. This
might be so if one accepts the motivating assumption, which was central to
the enactment of the statute, than an offender is more susceptible to corrective treatment and rehabilitation as a "youth" than in later years ....
(citations omitted).
Additionally, as counsel for petitioner suggested at oral argument, the two judges
who subsequently imposed the consecutive adult sentences, presumably knowing
that petitioner was currently serving a YCA sentence, might have decided to sentence petitioner as an adult precisely because he was currently YCA prisoner-printer, believing that after the completion of YCA treatment, further
treatment would not be needed; or that if petitioner had not benefited from treatment at the conclusion of his YCA sentence, he would not benefit from a second
YCA sentence.
We agree with the Eighth Circuit which stated in Mustain v. Pearson,592 F.2d
1018, 1021 (8th Cir. 1979) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
While the rehabilitative potential under [the YCA] might be lessened by a consecutively imposed consecutive adult sentence, this consequence stems from the
subsequent offence and does not invalidate the subsequent sentence .... Nor
could it render legally ineffective the [YCA] sentence.
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available to Congress, however, and Congress should consider either abolishing the YCA or investing the resources to better ensure
that its objectives are met."' There are many juvenile delinquency
prevention programs which have developed since the YCA was established."' Congress should examine the data concerning the efficacy of these programs and decide whether the YCA can be modified to be more consistent with current theory."'

111. The current trend is toward abolishing the YCA. In the process of recodifying the
entire federal criminal code, for example, it has been proposed that the YCA not be reenacted. See S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. (1977). Such a position is supported by corrections
officials. For example, Norman A. Carlson, Director of the Bureau of Prisons, testified
before the Judicial Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, stating:
While the Youth Corrections Act was a landmark at the time of its passage, we
believe that experience and changes which have taken place over the years have
caused the act to outlive its usefulness. We support those provisions of the proposed legislation to revise the Federal Criminal Code which would eliminate the
Youth Corrections Act. In our opinion, sentences for youthful offenders should not
be longer than those given older individuals who commit similar offenses.
Federal Prisons System, Monday Morning Highlights, October 13, 1978, at 2. In addition,
legal commentators have also questioned the YCA's efficacy. See Ritz, Federal Youth Corrections Act: The Continuing Charade, 13 U. RICH. L. Rav. 743 (1979); Seminar, Federal
Sentencing, supra note 37, at 83-84.

112. The available programs include juvenile diversion, earlier education programs, inhome family support services, and peer teaching. For a description of the programs which
have been funded by the federal government, see OFFICE oF JuvENIns JusTIcE & DExwQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JusricE, LAw ENFORCEMENT AssTANcE ADMm., REPORTS
OF THE NATIONAL JUVENILE JuncE AssEsSMENT CENTERs (1981).
113.

See DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, supra note 102, at 93-94; T. PALMER & R. LEwIS, AN

EVALUATION OF JUVENILE DIVERSION

(1980).

